The Child\u27s Action for Loss of Society and Companionship: The Next Logical Step - Theama v. Kenosha by Williams, Brian J.
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 62 Issue 1 Article 2 
December 1985 
The Child's Action for Loss of Society and Companionship: The 
Next Logical Step - Theama v. Kenosha 
Brian J. Williams 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Brian J. Williams, The Child's Action for Loss of Society and Companionship: The Next Logical Step - 
Theama v. Kenosha, 62 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 55 (1985). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol62/iss1/2 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
THE CHILD'S ACTION FOR LOSS OF SOCIETY AND
COMPANIONSHIP: THE NEXT LOGICAL STEP
Theama v. Kenosha
117 Wis.2d 508, 344 N.W.2d 513 (1984)
BRIAN J WILLIAMS*
INTRODUCTION
The courts repeatedly have disallowed a cause of action by a child
for the loss of love, care, guidance and companionship of an injured par-
ent.' Typically arguments against allowing the cause of action have
been: lack of precedential support for the action;2 uncertainty or diffi-
culty in ascertaining damage awards; 3 fear of a defendant being held lia-
ble to persons other than the child;4 fear of multiple claims and increased
litigation for a single tortious wrong;5 and the possibility that recovery
for the parent's injury and the child's injury might overlap. 6 However,
the Wisconsin courts have allowed parents7 and spouses8 to recover for
similar losses when a child or spouse has been injured. Nonetheless,
prior to the supreme court's decision in Theama v. Kenosha,9 the Wis-
consin courts had not extended the loss of society and companionship
cause of action to children of injured parents.
In Theama, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin looked beyond prior
* B.S. in Law Enforcement Administration from Western Illinois University, 1982. J.D. ex-
pected May 1986 from IT Chicago-Kent College of Law. This case comment is dedicated to Keith
Richards.
1. See infra note 31.
2. See, e.g., Koskela v. Martin, 91 111. App. 3d 568, 571, 414 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (1980); Gen-
eral Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 368, 498 P.2d 366, 371 (1972).
3. See, e.g., Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478, 480 (D. Neb. 1980); Russell v.
Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 507, 295 A.2d 862, 864 (1972).
4. For example, a recurrent argument is that if the child is allowed to recover for the parent's
injury, what prevents the right of action from being extended to a sibling, close friend or parent of
the injured parent who maintained a close relationship with the injured parent? See, e.g., Borer v.
American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 446, 563 P.2d 858, 861-62, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 305-06
(1977); Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 507, 295 A.2d 862, 864 (1972).
5. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 169, 368 P.2d 57, 60 (1962); Eschenbach v.
Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 380, 263 N.W. 154, 155-56 (1935) (overruled by Thill v. Modern Erecting
Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865 (1969)).
6. See, e.g., Halberg v. Young, 41 Hawaii 634, 646-47 (1957); Hoffman, at 169, 368 P.2d at 60;
Russell, at 507, 295 A.2d at 864.
7. Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975).
8. Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967).
9. 117 Wis. 2d 508, 344 N.W.2d 513 (1984).
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case law, confronted and rejected the typical arguments, and allowed a
new cause of action to a minor child for the loss of a negligently injured
parent's love, care, guidance, society and companionship.' 0 In short, it
took the next logical step. Initially, this comment will discuss the histori-
cal setting in which the case was decided. Next, this comment will illus-
trate the reasoning utilized by the court in reaching its decision. Finally,
this comment will analyze the reasoning employed by the court and dis-
cuss the possible problems flowing from this decision.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
At early common law, all rights stemming from injuries to family
members generally were held by the father under doctrine of paterfami-
lies." The father's rights derived from the master-servant relationship.
The father was analogized to the master, and the family members treated
as being legally comparable to servants. Therefore, the father had an
actionable claim for an injury to a family member resulting in the loss of
that family member's services. 12 However, the father's recovery was lim-
ited to the pecuniary value of the lost services13 and incidental expenses,
such as medical costs. 14 Over time, the sentimental value of such losses
gained recognition; thus, the father's loss of a family member's love, care
and companionship became compensable in court.1
5
A wife, at common law, did not have a similar action. The rationale
for this denial was the common law doctrine that a woman became le-
gally nonexistent as a person when she married and assumed a status
much like that of a chattel. 16 Eventually, in the landmark case of Hitaf-
fer v. Argonne Co. ,17 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
1950 recognized a cause of action by a wife for loss of society and com-
panionship when her husband was injured by another.
The Wisconsin common law basically tracked the common law of
10. Id.
11. For a discussion of the doctrine, see Fisher, Pater Familias-A Cooperative Enterprise, 41
ILL. L. REV. 27 (1946).
12. Lippmann, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 651, 652-53 (1930).
13. Note, New Infant Rights in Tort, 35 VA. L. REV. 618, 620 (1949).
14. Dennis v. Clark, 56 Mass. 347 (1848).
15. Selleck v. Janesville, 104 Wis. 570, 80 N.W. 944 (1899).
16. See Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1969).
17. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), rev'd in part on other grounds, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 914 (1957). Hitaffer was reversed on appeal on the ground that the
specific language of the District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 985 (1927),
barred a wife from maintaining an independent cause of action for loss of society and companionship
when her husband was injured on the job. Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220, 226 (D.C. Cir.
1957). The existence of the independent cause of action in other circumstances was not overruled.
Id.
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other states. Although the Wisconsin courts initially refused to follow
the Hitaffer lead, it adopted the cause of action allowing a wife to recover
for the loss of her injured husband's society and companionship1 8 in the
1967 case of Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co. 19 The next step
taken by the Wisconsin courts was to permit a parent to recover for the
loss of a child's society and companionship when the child was injured.
20
In addition to recognizing new causes of action, the Wisconsin
courts were developing a parallel line of reasoning concerning the proper
view of the parent-child relationship. No longer could the parent-child
relationship correctly be looked upon as analogous to the master-servant
relationship. 21 The Wisconsin courts noted that, in modem society, the
benefit of the parent-child relationship is not the child's potential earning
capacity; conversely, the parent's benefit in the relationship is more prop-
erly viewed as the child's society and companionship. 22 Further, the
Wisconsin judiciary recognized that serious injuries to a child can have a
"shattering effect" on the parent-child relationship and that "the loss of
the enjoyment of those experiences normally shared by parents and chil-
dren need[ed] no enumeration.
'23
Commentators and other courts also recognized the change in per-
ception of the parent-child relationship, and thus began to emphasize the
greaL detrimental impact on the child caused by an injury to the parent.
Prosser suggested that the loss of a parent's society and companionship
was a genuine and serious injury. 24 Another writer noted that such a loss
deprives a child of the "essentials for a healthy development" and that it
was of "the highest importance" to protect the benefits a child derives
from its parents. 25 The Supreme Court of Kansas deemed the parent-
18. See e.g., Nickel v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 269 Wis. 647, 70 N.W.2d 205 (1955).
19. 34 Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967). The Moran court stated: "The genius of the
common law is its ability to adapt itself to the changing needs of society." Noting the change in
societal conditions, the court believed that the time was ripe to adopt the action. Id. at 551-52, 150
N.W.2d at 141.
20. Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975). In Shockley, a mother gave
premature birth to twins. One child died at birth while one survived. As a result of doctor and
hospital negligence, the surviving child received too much oxygen, and therefore, suffered permanent
blindness and disfigurement. The court allowed the parents to recover for the loss of the injured
child's society and companionship. Id. at 404, 225 N.W.2d at 501. Prior to Shockley, recovery was
limited to the loss of the child's earning capacity and to the medical expenses incurred as a result of
the child's injury. Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co., 188 Wis. 376, 206 N.W. 198 (1925).
21. Shockley, 66 Wis. 2d at 400-01, 225 N.W.2d at 499-500.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 401, 225 N.W.2d at 499.
24. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 125 at 935-36 (5th ed. 1984).
25. Comment, The Child's Claim for Loss of Consortium Damages: A Logical and Sympathetic
Appeal, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV., 231, 237-38 (1975) (quoting Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 403,
37 N.W.2d 543, 545 (1949). See also Comment, The Child's Cause ofAction for Loss of Consortium,
5 U. SAN. FERN. V.L. REV. 449 (1975).
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child relationship to be "vitally important" and commented that the loss
of a parent's society and companionship deprived the child "of some-
thing that is indeed valuable and precious."'26
The stance taken by these authors and courts has been bolstered by
the United States Supreme Court's historical and continued recognition
of the rights of children under the Constitution. For example, the Court
recognized that children possess first amendment rights, 27 and are pro-
tected under the due process and equal protection clauses of the four-
teenth amendment. 28 Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized and
protected the integrity of the family unit.
29
It appears that factors such as the change in society's view of the
parent-child relationship, the potentially serious damage caused to a
child due to an injury inflicted upon its parent, the necessity of a parent's
society and companionship in the child's healthy development, the in-
creased protection of a child's constitutional rights, and the focus on the
integrity of the family unit point to need to compensate the child when
the parent-child relationship has been damaged by an injury to a parent.
Indeed, there seems to be a trend in the courts toward granting a cause of
action to compensate the child for such losses.
30
Despite this trend, however, the majority of jurisdictions have re-
fused to recognize the child's cause of action for loss of a parent's society
and companionship. 31  These courts have set forth several arguments
against granting the action. The first argument is that recognition of the
26. Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 168-69, 368 P.2d 57, 59 (1962).
27. See Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
28. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (due process); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)
(due process); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (due process); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (equal protection).
29. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Integrity of the family unit is protected by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, id., and the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). Protection of the integrity
of the family unit may also be afforded by the ninth amendment. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)
(recognizing the importance of family relationships).
30. Jurisdictions that have recognized a child's cause of action for loss of society and compan-
ionship are: Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980); Berger
v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 303 N.W.2d 424 (1981); Veland v. Reynolds Metals, 103 Wash. 2d 131, 691
P.2d 190 (1984); Theama v. Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 344 N.W.2d 513 (1984).
31. The jurisdictions that have declined to adopt the cause of action are: Early v. United
States, 474 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1973); Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d 471 (D.C.
Cir. 1958); Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478 (D. Neb. 1980); Turner v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. Co., 159 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Ga. 1958); Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d
441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977); Halberg v. Young, 41 Hawaii 634 (1957); Koskela v.
Martin, 91111. App. 3d 568, 414 N.E.2d 1148 (1980); Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 360 P.2d 57
(1962); Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 263 N.W. 154 (1935); General Elec. Co. v. Bush,
88 Nev. 360, 498 P.2d 366 (1972); Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d 862 (1972);
Duhan v. Milanowski, 75 Misc. 2d 1078, 348 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973); Gibson v. John-
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right to recover should be left to the legislature, or similarly, that a lack
of precedent restrains the courts from granting the right.
32
A second argument advanced by the courts concerns the assessment
of damages in such a case. This argument is two-fold. First, the determi-
nation and measure of damage is uncertain.33 In addition, the damages
are noncompensatory in nature.34 In this aspect of the argument, the
courts typically have noted that monetary compensation will not allow
the child to regain the parent's lost society and companionship. Further,
to say that the child will be compensated is a mere fiction; in reality, the
child can never be compensated for such an injury. Therefore, monetary
compensation amounts to a future benefit not related to the present
loss.35
The courts' third argument against allowing the cause of action is
that it will increase the number of parties entitled to recover for a defend-
ant's negligence. 36 These courts are wary that once a child's action is
recognized, the door may be open to allow siblings, friends or relatives to
recover for the loss of the injured's society and companionship. Thus, it
is necessary to draw the line of liability before the door is opened.
37
The fourth argument advanced by the courts is that multiple claims
and increased litigation will arise if the new cause of action is allowed.
The thrust of this argument is that if an independent action for the child
is recognized, each child of an injured parent would have its own right of
action, allowing multiple lawsuits to arise from a single occurrence. 38
For example, if an injured parent had several children, in the absence of
any legally compelled joinder or consolidation rule, each child could
bring suit at different times. Therefore, the tortfeasor would be forced to
ston, 144 N.E.2d 310 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956); Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 52 Or.
App. 853, 631 P.2d 1377 (1981), aff'd 293 Or. 543, 652 P.2d 318 (1982).
32. See Koskela v. Martin, 91 Ill. App. 3d at 570-71, 414 N.W.2d at 1150-51; Norwest v.
Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 52 Or. App. at 858-60, 631 P.2d at 1380.
33. The thrust of this argument is that considering the intangible nature of the loss of society
and companionship, the damage figure cannot be reached through any precise computation or calcu-
lation. By comparison, a damage award for medical expenditures can arguably be more accurately
determined by the use of tangible documentation, such as medical bills. See Hoesing v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 484 F. Supp. at 480; Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d at 447-48, 563 P.2d at
862-63, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306-07; Koskela, 91 111. App. 3d at 571, 414 N.E.2d at 1151.
34. See Hoesing, 484 F. Supp. at 479; Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 447-48, 563 P.2d at 862-63, 138 Cal.
Rptr. at 306-07.




38. Hoesing, 484 F. Supp. at 478-79; Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 449, 563 P.2d at 863, 138 Cal. Rptr. at
307; Koskela, 91 111. App. 3d at 572, 414 N.E.2d at 1151.
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defend several lawsuits on several different occasions which arose out of
one event.
A final argument attacking the recognition of the child's cause of
action is the potential for double recovery. Some courts have reasoned
that an injured parent may be compensated for loss of future earnings
which, in part, aid the ability to care for that parent's family. These
courts believe that juries might include the injured parent's inability to
support the child when measuring the child's damage award in an action
for loss of a parent's society and companionship. Therefore, there is a
possibility of an overlap in damage awards; both the parent and child
would be compensated for the parent's loss of future earnings.3 9
Prior to Theama v. Kenosha,4° the Wisconsin courts had not permit-
ted a child to recover for the loss of an injured parent's society and com-
panionship. 41 However, the Wisconsin courts had held that a parent
could recover for the loss of society and companionship of a child during
minority when the loss was caused by another's negligent conduct. 42 Ad-
ditionally, a parent or a minor child could recover for such a loss under
the Wisconsin wrongful death statute.43 It was against this backdrop
that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided Theama.
THEAMA V. KENOSHA
FACTS OF THE CASE
At approximately 2:30 in the morning on June 27, 1978, Robert
Theama was driving his motorcycle through the streets of Kenosha, Wis-
consin. 44 Due to insufficient lighting on the street, Theama was unable to
see a deep hole in the surface of the public highway. Theama's motorcy-
cle struck the hole. As a result of the impact, Theama lost control of the
39. Koskela, 91 111. App. 3d at 571-72, 414 N.E.2d at 1151. See also Hoesing, 484 F. Supp. at
480; Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 449, 563 P.2d at 866, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 310; Russell v. Salem Transp. Co.,
61 N.J. 502, 507, 295 A.2d 862, 867 (1972).
40. 117 Wis. 2d 508, 344 N.W.2d 513 (1984).
41. Id. at 511, 344 N.W.2d at 514.
42. Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975).
43. The Wisconsin wrongful death action statute can be found at Wis. STAT. § 895.04(4)
(1985). Inter alia, the statute allows for recovery by unemancipated or dependent children of up to
$50,000 for the loss of deceased parents' society and companionship. Further, the loss of society and
companionship has been recognized as an element of damages under the statute and its predecessors
since 1931. See 1931 Wis. Laws ch. 263, § 1(2). It should be noted that the Wisconsin courts have
interpreted the wrongful death action statute to establish a priority system for recovery. Under this
priority system, a child has an independent cause of action for loss of the deceased parents' society
and companionship only when neither parent survives. Cogger v. Trudell, 35 Wis. 2d 350, 151
N.W.2d 146 (1967).
44. Theama v. Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 509, 344 N.W.2d 513, 513 (1984).
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motorcycle and was thrown from the vehicle.45 The accident caused se-
vere injuries to Theama's head and internal organs which resulted in per-
manent brain damage and impairment of visual, perceptual, motor and
speech functions.46 In addition, Theama sustained other physical and
emotional injuries.
47
Theama brought suit against the City of Kenosha and Employers
Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin. 48 The complaint
contained four claims. 49 The third and fourth claims were brought on
behalf of Theama's minor children, Terry and Tracy Theama, to recover
for the loss of their father's care, society, companionship, protection,
training and guidance50 which resulted from his extensive injuries. 51
The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment
on the claims involving the minor children. The trial court reasoned that
despite the permanence of the father's injuries, no independent common
law action for loss of consortium could be justified when both the chil-
dren's mother and father were still living.5 2
Theama appealed and, in an unpublished opinion, the court of ap-
peals summarily affirmed the trial court's ruling.5 3  Theama then ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. The issue on appeal was:
"whether or not a minor child may maintain a cause of action against a
tortfeasor for loss of society and companionship of a parent. '54 The
question was one of first impression for the court. 55 Although the action
did not exist at common law,56 the supreme court reversed the lower
court's decision and remanded the case holding that, "a minor child may
recover for the loss of a parent's society and companionship caused by
negligent injury to the parent."'57
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 510, 344 N.W.2d at 513.
48. Hereinafter referred to collectively as "defendants."
49. The first and second claims of the complaint were not an issue on appeal. In the first claim,
Robert Theama sought damages for his own injuries as well as for pain and suffering, loss of earnings
and earning capacity, expenses for past and future care, and for past and future medical expenses. In
the second claim, Theama's wife, Patricia Theama, sought damages for the loss of support, society,
companionship and consortium due to her husband's injuries. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 510, 344
N.W.2d at 513.
50. Hereinafter these losses will be referred to collectively as "loss of society and
companionship."
51. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 510, 344 N.W.2d at 513.
52. Id. at 510, 344 N.W.2d at 514. The trial court relied heavily on Cogger v. Trudell, 35 Wis.
2d 350, 151 N.W.2d 146 (1967). See supra note 43.
53. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 510, 344 N.W.2d at 513.
54. Id. at 511, 344 N.W.2d at 513.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 509, 344 N.W.2d at 513.
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THE REASONING OF THE COURT
The Theama court made clear very early in its opinion that, for the
first time, a Wisconsin court would sanction a child's action for loss of a
parent's society and companionship. 58 After reviewing the historical de-
velopment of the cause of action,5 9 the court stated: "it would be con-
trary to justice to deny the gravity of harm suffered by a child who is
deprived of his or her parent's society and companionship due to an-
other's negligence."
'60
The court first addressed the argument that there was no precedent
in Wisconsin case law to support the new action, and moreover, that the
legislature was the appropriate forum for recognition of the right. 61 The
court's response was that the rule denying the child's action was a crea-
ture of the court, not the legislature; therefore, the duty to change the
rule if and when it became outdated fell just as much on the court as on
the legislature. 62 In addition, the supreme court found convincing analo-
gous precedent that protected the society and companionship interest in
the husband-wife relationship and the similar interest of a parent in the
parent-child relationship and noted that the child had a very similar in-
terest.63 The conclusion was clear: the next logical step in the current
progression was the protection of the child's interest in the parent-child
relationship. 64
The Theama court next dealt with the problem of the uncertainty of
damages to be recovered in the child's action for loss of society and com-
panionship. Reasoning by analogy was again employed. The court drew
an analogy to causes of action allowing recovery for similar intangible
injuries. The court pointed out that recovery is allowed under Wisconsin
law for: pain and suffering in personal injury65 and wrongful death ac-
58. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 509, 344 N.E.2d at 513 (1984).
59. For a discussion of the historical context, see supra notes 11-43 and accompanying text.
60. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 518, 344 N.W.2d at 518. The court emphasized that it believed
that it was its "mandate by oath to do justice, as well as [its] conscience" to recognize the cause of
action. Id. at 520, 344 N.W.2d at 518.
61. Thearna, 117 Wis. 2d at 518-19, 344 N.W.2d at 518.
62. Id. at 519, 344 N.W.2d at 518. The court stated that it would not be difficult to simply
follow precedent with the "vast support from dusty books;" however, the court feared that the
"dust" from "the decision would remain in [its] mouths, a reproach to law and conscience alike."
Id. (citing Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 37-38, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960)).
63. See Moran, 34 Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1969), and Shockley, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225
N.W.2d 495 (1975). The Theama court noted that in these decisions, it did not wait for the legisla-
ture to create similar causes of action on behalf of the wife or parents. Further, the Theama court
added that deferral to the legislature in the case at bar would be tantamount to the court "shirking"
its responsibility. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 521, 344 N.W.2d at 519.
64. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 521, 344 N.W.2d at 519.
65. Sennott v. Seeber, 6 Wis. 2d 590, 95 N.W.2d 269 (1959).
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tions;66 loss of consortium of a spouse in personal injury actions;67 loss of
a spouse's society and companionship in a wrongful death suit;68 and,
loss of a minor child's society and companionship in both personal in-
jury 69 and wrongful death suits. 70 Like a child's injury of the loss of a
parent's society and companionship, the above mentioned injuries are in-
tangible and nonpecuniary. Nonetheless, the Theama court declared
that courts and juries daily assess damages for such uncertainties with
apparent success.
71
The court next addressed the contention that such injuries to a child
are noncompensatory in nature. In short, monetary compensation could
not replace a parent's society and companionship. 72 The court found this
to be unpersuasive. According to the court, monetary compensation is a
substitute, albeit a poor one, for a parent's society and companionship.
In spite of the unsatisfactory nature of the substitute, an award of money
damages is the "only workable way that [the] legal system has found to
ease the injured party's tragic loss."'73 The Theama court continued by
discussing other possible benefits of a monetary damage award to the
child. Along with other benefits, 74 the damage award could be used to
aid the child's continued normal and complete mental development.
75
Finally, it noted that allowing the child an independent recovery ensures
that the award will be utilized for the child's benefit, not by the parent
for other purposes.
76
The court then considered the argument that the new cause of ac-
tion would increase the number of parties entitled to recovery based on a
tortfeasor's conduct. According to this argument, by permitting a child
an independent cause of action, a new class of plaintiffs would be created,
66. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).
67. Ballard v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 33 Wis. 2d 601, 148 N.W.2d 65 (1967).
68. Herro v. Steidl, 255 Wis. 65, 37 N.W.2d 874 (1949).
69. Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975).
70. Peot v. Ferraro, 83 Wis. 2d 727, 266 N.W.2d 586 (1978).
71. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 522, 344 N.W.2d at 520.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 523, 344 N.W.2d at 520. The court added that monetary damages are much more
preferable than the alternative of totally denying recovery. Id.
74. One author commented that the award may be used to acquire live-in help who, aside from
providing domestic aid, could offer the child some incidental guidance and companionship. Addi-
tionally, the damage award may be used to procure necessary psychiatric treatment for the child
arising out of the child's possible maladjustment to its loss. The writer suggested that this may make
the difference between satisfactory and unsatisfactory adjustment to the loss. Note, The Child's
Right to Sue for Loss of a Parent's Love, Care and Companionship Caused by Tortious Injury to the
Parent, 56 B.U.L. REV. 722, 734 (1976).
75. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 523, 344 N.W.2d at 520.
76. Id. at 524, 344 N.W.2d at 520-21. The court reasoned that to deny the child's right to
recover premised on the notion that a parent's society and companionship is irreplaceable would be
to perpetuate an error. Id. at 524, 344 N.W.2d at 520.
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including friends, siblings or other relatives of the injured parent. 77 The
Theama court was not swayed by this argument. It believed that the
argument failed to consider the importance of the nuclear family and the
foreseeability factor. Emphasis was placed on the fact that in other ac-
tions for loss of society and companionship in the family setting, 78 courts
have readily limited the right to recover to those most likely to be se-
verely affected by the loss. 79
The next major argument addressed by the court was the issue of
increased litigation. The problem posited was that recognition of the
new action would permit each injured child to bring suit; thus, multiple
lawsuits potentially could arise from a single occurrence.8 0 The court
first pointed out that, in the instant case, the issue was not presented
because the claims of the children were combined with the claims of the
parents. 8' However, the Theama court went on to explain that the argu-
ment lacked merit. It reasoned that the fear of increased litigation is a
common, if not standard, fear whenever a court is called upon to recog-
nize a new cause of action; nonetheless, that has not prevented courts
from allowing new causes of action.
8 2
The final argument confronted by the supreme court related to
double recovery. The concern was that juries may take into account the
child's loss of a parent's support when arriving at the child's damage
award for the loss of society and companionship even though this loss is
not relevant to the cause of action. Since the parent, when injured by
another, is entitled to recover for the loss of ability to support the child,
there is the potential for overlap in compensation.8 3 However, the court
believed that this problem could be easily remedied by limiting the par-
77. Id. at 524, 344 N.W.2d at 521.
78. See Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 286 (Iowa 1981). The Supreme Court of Iowa in Weitl
ruled that a child has an independent cause of action for loss of parental consortium. The court
overruled Weitl in Audubon-Extra Ready Mix, Inc. v. Illinois Cent. Gulf. Ry. Co., 335 N.W.2d 148
(Iowa 1983). In this case, the court ruled that under an Iowa statute, I.C.A. § 613.15, a child's claim
for loss of parental consortium should be brought by the administrator if the parent was dead, or by
the injured parent if the parent survived. However, the child could not bring the action indepen-
dently. Id.
79. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 524, 344 N.W.2d at 521. The court noted that most children are
emotionally dependent on their parents while the same is not usually true for other remote relatives
or friends of the parent. In addition it is not foreseeable, as in the case of a child, that a remote
relative or friend will suffer serious emotional impairment as a result of the parent's injury. Id. at
524-25, 344 N.W.2d at 521 (citing 56 B.U.L. REV. at 738, supra note 74).
80. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 525-26, 344 N.W.2d at 521.
81. Id. at 526, 344 N.W.2d at 521.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 526, 344 N.W.2d at 521-22. The court noted that the same problem comes into play
when a wife sues for the loss of a husband's consortium; yet, the courts have allowed recovery in
those situations. Id. See Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137
(1967).
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ent's recovery to the child's loss of the parent's inability to monetarily
support the child. Further, the child's recovery would be limited to the
loss of the parent's society and companionship.8 4
Having recognized the new cause of action, 85 the court proceeded to
characterize the action. The supreme court stated that the child must
prove a prima facie negligence case.8 6 Further, any defenses available
against the injured parent to limit or bar recovery, such as contributory
negligence, will affect the child's action in a similar fashion. 87 The new
cause of action was limited by presently allowing recovery only where
the child has not yet reached the age of majority.8 8 Once again, the court
emphasized that recovery shall be limited to a child's loss of a parent's
society and companionship. 89 Finally, the court acknowledged that the
legislature may expand the action, place a ceiling on the amount recover-
able, or abolish the action altogether. 90
ANALYSIS
No precedent existed in Wisconsin case law squarely on point which
mandated the Theama holding. Clearly the case law in the majority of
jurisdictions called for a contrary decision.a ! However, by analogizing to
similar actions, the Theama court was willing to take the next logical
step in recognizing a child's action for loss of society and companionship.
The court correctly demonstrated that the judiciary plays a critical role
in the development of the common law.92 The common law does not
consist of an absolute set of rules. On the contrary, it is a breathing body
of general principles subject to judicial adaptation to societal conditions
and perceptions of justice.93 In fact, "the peculiar boast and excel-
lence" 94 and the "genius of the common law is its ability to adapt itself to
84. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 526, 344 N.W.2d at 522.
85. Id. at 527, 344 N.W.2d at 522.
86. Id. Here the court noted that in this respect, the new action was basically the same as the
parent's claim for personal injuries.
87. Id.
88. Id. The reasoning behind the limitation was that the child's minority is when the parent-
child relationship will be the most gravely affected by a negligent injury to the parent. Id.
89. Under this action, the child would not recover for the loss of the injured parent's financial
support. Id. at 528, 344 N.W.2d at 522. The ruling is consistent with the limit placed by the court
in Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975), on a parent's right to recover for the
loss of a child's society and companionship.
90. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 528, 344 N.W.2d at 522. The court limited the ruling in this case
to causes of action arising on or after March 8, 1984. Id.
91. See supra note 31.
92. See Friedmann, Legal Philosophy and Judicial Lawmaking, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 821 (1961).
93. Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 406, 37 N.W.2d 543, 547 (1949).
94. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884).
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the changing needs of society."'95 Based on society's and the law's chang-
ing view of the parent-child and family relationships, 96 the need to
change the law in these areas is readily apparent.
The creation of a new cause of action does not require legislative
intervention. As the Theama court accurately noted, the rule denying a
child's cause of action was fashioned by the courts. 97 The courts, how-
ever, have allowed parents,98 and spouses9 9 to recover for similar injuries.
In none of these situations has there been legislative intervention, nor
have there been any apparent significant problems arising out of the rec-
ognition of these recoveries such as massive public outcry or an uncon-
trollable flood of litigation. It seems natural and consistent to take the
next step in the progression to compensate the child for the potentially
devastating loss of his parent's society and companionship. It seems just
as natural and consistent for the courts to take the step.
There is nothing preventing the legislature from altering the new
cause of action if it believes that such alternatives are necessary.1°°
Moreover, considering that the common law, in part, functions to mold
the law to fit societal changes, it would also be within the realm of the
court's duty to limit, or even abolish, the new action if society called for a
change. Lack of precedent or legislative action should not bar a child's
recovery.
The uncertainty of the measure of damages and the noncompensa-
tory nature of the damages in a minor child's action for loss of society
and companionship presents a problem. It is true that money is not an
adequate replacement for society and companionship. 01 Similarly,
money cannot adequately replace the negligently caused loss of a limb.
However, courts do allow recovery in tort for the loss of limb due to
negligence or other similar injuries. As one writer stated: "When the
tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the
amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamen-
95. Moran, 34 Wis. 2d at 551, 150 N.W.2d at 141.
96. See supra notes 11-43 and accompanying text.
97. Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975).
98. Id. at 401, 225 N.W.2d at 499.
99. Moran, 34 Wis. 2d at 551-52, 150 N.W.2d at 141.
100. Indeed, the Theama court acknowledged that limitation, expansion and abolition of the
new right was within the scope of legislative action. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 528, 344 N.W.2d at
522.
101. Uncertainty as to damages led one court to deny recovery to a parent for the loss of a child's
society and companionship. Baxter v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 563
P.2d 871, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977).
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tal principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person."',0 2  It
cannot reasonably be argued that somewhat inadequate relief is less bene-
ficial to an injured party than no relief at all.
That the injury is intangible should not bar recovery. Under the law
of Wisconsin, 103 as well as other state law, I when one spouse suffers an
injury, the other spouse's recovery may include reimbursement for such
sentimental aspects of the marital relationship as loss of comfort, sexual
relations, society and companionship-commonly known as "loss of con-
sortium." In other areas of the law, courts have allowed recovery for
intangible injuries. 105 Additionally, in the area of the parent-child rela-
tionship, the courts have allowed parents to recover damages for sorrow,
mental distress, grief, 10 6 and mental anguish10 7 under wrongful death
statutes for the death of a minor child. 108 Juries are capable of measur-
ing such damages. 0 9
The Theama court believed that poor compensation is better than
no compensation and that juries are capable of assessing damages for
intangible injuries. However, the possible beneficial uses set forth by the
court of the compensation award are not altogether convincing. The
court suggested that the money may be used to assure the child's healthy
and normal mental development, to hire live-in help who could contrib-
ute domestic services, as well as some incidental guidance, and to pay for
any psychiatric help needed by the child. 10 The court added that proper
limitations and allowing the child a recovery independent of the parent's
recovery would guarantee that the money would be used for the child's
benefit, not for other purposes such as for the child's support."'
However, there is no convincing evidence that a person's wealth
during minority has a causal relationship to that person's healthy and
normal mental development. Further, it seems contrary to the purpose
102. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES § 27 at 102 (quoting Story Parchment v. Paterson
Co., 282 U.S. 555, 558 (1930)).
103. Ballard v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 33 Wis. 2d 601, 148 N.W.2d 65 (1967).
104. See, e.g., Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 16, 303 N.W.2d 424, 427 (1981).
105. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (mental
distress); Pallas v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33 N.W.2d 911 (1948) (privacy); Williams
v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949) (prenatal injuries).
106. Dawson v. Hill & Hill Truck Lines, 671 P.2d 589 (Mont. 1983).
107. Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
108. See, Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975) (allowing parent to recover
loss of minor child's society and companionship at common law); Peot v. Ferraro, 83 Wis. 2d 727,
266 N.W.2d 586 (1978) (allowing parent to recover loss of minor child's society and companionship
in wrongful death actions).
109. Love, Tortious Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an Injured Person's
Society and Companionship, 51 IND. L.J. 590, 626-28 (1976).
110. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 523-24, 344 N.W.2d at 520.
111. Id. at 524, 527, 344 N.W.2d at 520-21, 522.
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of the award-to aid in the child's mental development-for the court to
approve of the idea that the money be used to hire live-in help who may
offer some "incidental" guidance to the child. Additionally, if the money
could be used to acquire psychiatric treatment for the child, the next
logical step would be to use the money for other types of medical treat-
ment not necessitated by the child's loss. It would be better for the court
to include live-in help and medical expenses in the parent's damage
award for loss of ability to support the family.
If, as the Theama court suggested, the money award is limited to the
time period when the child is a minor to aid in the child's development,
another problem arises. It is clear that a minor child does not have the
capacity to dictate the disposition of the money. If the money were to be
placed in a trust until the child reaches majority, the money would not be
used during the child's minority.'1 12 It is obvious that the money must be
controlled by someone other than the child. If that person is a parent or
family member, it is questionable that the money would be used to aid
the child's mental and emotional development if the family came upon
lean times financially. If the duty were to be placed on a person outside
the family, the integrity of the family unit may be threatened. 113 The
current workload of the courts would make judicial control over the
money next to impossible.
The court may have faltered in suggesting practical applications of
the damage award. The practical applications, such as payment for psy-
chiatric care, are tangible. This presents the conceptual problem of
awarding tangible relief for an intangible loss, and substitutes apples for
oranges. However, the fundamental purpose of the damage award is to
compensate the victim in the best manner available at law. With this
purpose in mind, it is clear that in spite of these dispositional drawbacks,
monetary compensation remains superior to the alternative of no
compensation.
In analyzing the argument that granting the cause of action to the
child would expose the tortfeasor to increased liability to a greater
number of plaintiffs, the supreme court focused on the nuclear family
and the factor of foreseeability. 114 However, the court did not explicitly
hold that the action was limited solely to children though it did "pres-
112. If the damage award were placed in a trust to be used throughout the child's minority,
additional problems arise. The child during minority would lack the capacity to control the use of
the trust funds. Therefore, the disposition of the money would necessarily have to be controlled by
someone other than the child.
113. Concern for the integrity of the family unit was the foundation of the Theama decision. See
supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
114. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 524, 344 N.W.2d at 521.
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ently" limit the action to minor children. 1 5 Although arguably quali-
fied, this holding is somewhat open-ended. Thus, the possibility is left
open for persons other than children to recover for the loss of the in-
jured's society and companionship. It is not certain that in the future an
aged parent of an injured parent would be denied recovery under a simi-
lar action. The same may hold true for a close friend of the injured or a
distant relative who lives in the injured's home. Allowing such actions
may open the floodgate to a vast array of litigation.
It is of first importance for the court to adhere to the underlying
principle that a minor child, not other friends or relatives of the parent,
will suffer the most severe damage when a parent is injured. Children are
usually dependent upon their parents for emotional sustenance, while
this is rarely the case with more remote relatives.1 16 It appears that the
Wisconsin court is prepared to draw the line of recovery at minor chil-
dren. However, this court was willing to expand the loss of society and
companionship to children because it was the next logical step in the
progression. 117 The court was quick to point out that one of the stellar
features of the common law is its ability to adapt to societal change.' 
1 8
However, the court should wait until societal change dictates the exten-
sion of the new action to others beyond minor children.
The court gave short shrift to the argument that if a new action is
recognized, each child would have an independent lawsuit. The argu-
ment is that, since the injured parent would also have a claim, a defend-
ant may be faced with defending a number of separate lawsuits at
different times. The Theama court dismissed this argument by pointing
out that the issue was not at bar because the parent's and children's
claims had been consolidated." 9 Nonetheless, the court added that this
argument is common to nearly every case in which a court is asked to
recognize a new action and that the argument lacks merit. 120
In light of the fact that the court was willing to qualify and set limits
on the cause of action, 121 it would not have been unreasonable for the
court to give more in-depth consideration to this argument and to set
some guidelines. Some courts have required that a spouse claiming loss
115. Id. at 527-28, 344 N.W.2d at 522.
116. Note, The Child's Right to Sue for Loss of a Parent's Love, Care and Companionship Caused
by Tortious Injury to the Parent, 56 B.U.L. REV. at 738, supra note 74.
117. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 519, 344 N.W.2d at 518.
118. Id. at 511, 344 N.W.2d at 514.
119. Id. at 526, 344 N.W.2d at 521.
120. Id. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 428-29 (1971) (Black,
J., dissenting) (recognizing damages for fourth amendment violations).
121. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 527, 344 N.W.2d at 522. The court discussed the elements of a
prima facie case, possible defenses and certain limits on recovery.
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of consortium join the claim with that of the physically injured spouse. 122
Other courts have merely suggested the same.123 The court could have
solved the consolidation problem by analogizing to the Wisconsin wrong-
ful death statute which mandates that all separate causes of action arising
out of a wrongful death suit "shall" be consolidated upon the motions of
"any" party. 124 The Theama court could have followed suit and devel-
oped some joinder rules, but the court declined to do so. A related prob-
lem concerns settlements. All settlements may be deterred if a child is
permitted to bring suit after the parent's claim is settled. However, ter-
mination of the parent's or child's claim by either settlement or judgment
could operate to bar the other claim.125 Joinder or termination guide-
lines would lessen the burden of multiple suits and put that argument to
rest. The Theama court would have done well to stake out joinder and
settlement guidelines. However, considering that the consolidation issue
was not before the court, such rulings would have been mere dicta.
The court did not go into great detail in discussing the problem of
possible overlapping damage awards. 126 The court reasoned that the
problem readily could be cured by limiting the injured parent's recovery
to the loss of the parent's pecuniary ability to support the child and to
limit the child's recovery to the loss of the injured parent's society and
companionship. 127 Though not explicit in the court's opinion, the most
rational method of accomplishing this separation would be to carefully
and specifically instruct the jury as to exactly which injuries are to be
compensated under each action. Moreover, specific instructions coupled
with the joinder of the parent's and child's claim, could deter a jury from
secretly awarding damages for the loss of the parent's ability to finan-
cially support the child in the child's action if the suit were to be brought
alone, or for the child's loss of the parent's society and companionship in
the parent's action if the parent's action were to be brought alone. This
would bring into the open and legitimize what arguably 28 some juries
currently practice, motivated by a gut sense of justice, in deliberations.
122. See, e.g., Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462, 466 (Alaska 1974); General Elec. v. Bush, 88
Nev. 360, 367-68, 498 P.2d 366, 371 (1972).
123. See, e.g., Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40, 45 (Fla. 1971); Kotsiris v. Ling, 451 S.W.2d 411,
412-13 (Ky. 1970).
124. Wis. STAT. § 895.04(3) (1985).
125. Cf. Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 507-08, 239 N.E.2d 897, 902-
03, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 312 (1968).
126. For a discussion of the problem of overtapping damages, see supra notes 83-84 and accom-
panying text.
127. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 526, 344 N.W.2d at 521-22.
128. See, e.g., Halberg v. Young, 41 Hawaii 634, 646-47 (1957); Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61
N.J. 502, 507, 295 A.2d 862, 864 (1972).
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The court left some minor procedural questions unanswered. Yet,
these questions should be resolved under the body of case law sure to
develop in the wake of the Theama decision. The court simply was not
willing to shut its doors to the injured child due to potential procedural
difficulties.
The Theama decision brings Wisconsin common law into harmony
with the spirit of tort common law. Tort law is concerned with relational
interests which cannot be characterized as tangible things such as prop-
erty or the individual. One such interest is the family interest which con-
sists of the husband-wife and parent-child relationships. The damage to
the family interest can be far greater than the damage to individual fam-
ily members. 129 Society and companionship have been defined as ele-
ments of the family interest. 130 The Theama decision helps protect the
family interest by allowing compensation to be awarded when there is
injury to one of the relationships that makes up the family interest.
Moreover, tort law has turned away from the pecuniary rationales
of the master-servant relationship and loss of earning capacity as bases
for allowing a parent to recover for an injured child. Common law ac-
tions for abduction and seduction of a child allowed a parent recovery
based on the master-servant relationship and loss of services.13 1 How-
ever, as Prosser noted, pecuniary loss was a mere peg on which to hang
the real damages, injury to the family relationship. 32
Additionally, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Shockley v. Prier133
recognized that, today, a child's earnings are viewed as his own. 134 Con-
sidering that Wisconsin law has lowered the age of majority from 21 to
18, the possibility of a parent acquiring a child's earnings are even more
remote. 35 The Shockley case recognized that a parent's loss when a
child is injured cannot be stated in purely pecuniary terms. The loss also
includes damages to the family interest. 3 6 The Theama decision makes
clear what was implicit in Shockley, that when the family relationship is
the protected interest and a parent, a part of the relationship, is injured,
the child's injury is more than simply pecuniary loss.
129. Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REV. 462-64 (1935).
130. Note, Wrongful Death Damages: Recovery of Investment In and Society and Companion-
ship of a Child, 27 OHIo ST. L.J. 355, 357 (1966).
131. See, e.g., Young v. Young, 236 Ala. 627, 631, 184 So. 187, 191 (1938) (seduction); Meredith
v. Buster, 209 Ky. 623, 273 S.W. 454 (1924) (abduction).
132. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 124 at 927 (5th ed. 1984).
133. 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975).
134. Id. at 400, 225 N.W.2d at 499 (quoting Katz, Shroeder & Sidmen, Emancipating Our Chil-
dren-Coming of Legal Age in America, 7 FAM. L.Q. 211, 224-25).
135. Id. at 399, 225 N.W.2d at 498.
136. Id. at 401, 225 N.W.2d at 499.
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A strong policy justification compels the result of Theama. A child
suffers a serious loss when deprived of a parent's society and companion-
ship. The loss of these benefits can have a severe detrimental impact on
the child's development, leading to adverse consequences on the child's
welfare and personality for the duration of his life.
137
A benefit of the court's ruling on Theama is that it eliminates possi-
ble inconsistencies in Wisconsin law. As stated, Wisconsin common law
under Shockley permits a parent to recover for the loss of a child's soci-
ety and companionship. Had the Theama court ruled in favor of the
defendants, a child would be denied an analogous cause of action. If the
interest sought to be protected in such cases is the family interest, a con-
trary decision in Theama would clearly lead to anomalous results. In the
eyes of the law, the benefits of the parent-child relationship would, in
effect, be a one-way street. Further, considering the possible impact on a
child's development when a parent is injured, the child's interest in an
undisturbed family relationship deserves at least as much, if not more,
protection than a parent's similar interest. The Theama decision puts to
rest these possible conflicts.
Aside from ending the possible inconsistencies at common law,
Theama reduces possible conflicts with the Wisconsin wrongful death
statute. Pursuant to the statute, a child may recover for the loss of the
parents' society and companionship. 138 Denying the child's action would
warrant the conclusion that, under Wisconsin law, the child suffers an
injury worthy of compensation only when his parents are killed. If the
parents' deaths are the essential element to the child's recovery under the
wrongful death statute, it follows that a parent rendered comatose, per-
manently disabled or vegetative by a negligent act would not be grounds
for a recovery by the child. In short, the law would distinguish between
a dead and a nonfunctioning, but living, parent. Common sense dictates
that such a distinction is without merit. In both situations, the child is
deprived of the parent's society and companionship and the family rela-
tionship is severely damaged. The Theama decision illustrates that the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin has not lost its common sense.
137. P. MUSSEN, J. CONGER & J. KAGAN, CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND PERSONALITY 404-06
(6th ed. 1984).
138. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. Illinois has a similar wrongful death act. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 70 §§ 1-2.2 (1981). Under the Illinois statute, a child may recover for the loss of a
deceased parent's society and guidance. The phrase "pecuniary injuries" as used in the statute has
been interpreted to include the minor child being deprived of the deceased parent's companionship,
guidance, love and affection. Hall v. Gillins, 13 I11. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958).
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CONCLUSION
Despite the lack of supporting case precedent, the Theama court
took a bold stand by recognizing a new cause of action for a child when a
parent is negligently injured. In doing so, the court declined to adhere to
dated case law founded upon an ancient view of the parent-child relation-
ship. The court was willing to adapt the law to the perceived changing
desires and needs of society.
The decision, however, does not solve all problems. Limitations and
guidelines may quickly become necessary. Measuring damages may
prove to be somewhat akin to a game of roulette. It may also be true that
the court was motivated in part by a strong feeling of compassion for the
aggrieved child. Nonetheless, when devastating loss has been suffered,
the courts have the ability to offer the only practical relief, money dam-
ages. The problems are minor when compared to the tragic loss sus-
tained, and these problems may be worked out in future cases. From the
perspective of the child, the decision at worst affords inadequate relief as
opposed to no relief. At best, the decision could provide a strong boost
to the healthy mental and emotional development of the child if the
award is properly applied.
Prior to Theama, Wisconsin case law afforded relief for loss of a
spouse's consortium, society and companionship, and afforded relief for
the loss of a child's society and companionship. Through these causes of
action, the integrity of the family unit gained greater respect and protec-
tion. Logic and equity demanded the similar protection for the interests
of the child. In creating the new course of action, the Theama court took
the next logical step.

